Remove Flock from Apex.

The Town of Apex has deployed Flock automated license plate readers that record and store the movements of every vehicle on surveilled roads. The data is searchable by law enforcement without a warrant. No public vote authorized the deployment. No independent audit has evaluated its effectiveness. DeFlock Apex is a resident-led campaign to remove Flock, stop expansion, and require public approval before any surveillance technology is deployed in Apex.

Independent resident-led advocacy project. Built from public records, council materials, and direct civic engagement.

Last updated: May 13, 2026

Where Council stands

Flock stays or goes because six elected officials decide. This tracker shows our current read on each member's position. The Council appears divided. Resident pressure can still shape the outcome.

2
Leaning Remove
2
Persuadable
2
Keep Flock
Terry Mahaffey
Mayor Pro Tem
Leaning Remove
Has raised concerns about surveillance scope and accountability in council discussion. Appears receptive to removal or significant restriction.
Shane Reese
Council Member
Leaning Remove
Has expressed skepticism about Flock's value and concerns about civil liberties implications. Appears likely to support removal.
Sue Mu
Council Member
Persuadable
Has not publicly committed to a clear position. May be weighing constituent input. Direct outreach from residents is especially important.
Arno Zegerman
Council Member
Persuadable
Has not publicly committed to a clear position. May be open to evidence-based arguments about accountability gaps and effectiveness.
Jacques K. Gilbert
Mayor
Keep Flock
Has publicly supported the Flock program. Position appears firm based on council statements and responses to residents.
Ed Gray
Council Member
Keep Flock
Has publicly supported the Flock program. Position appears firm based on council statements and responses to residents.

If a Council member believes their position is misstated, they can clarify it in writing and we will update the tracker. Positions are based on public comments, council discussion, written responses, votes, and direct resident engagement.

What the Apex record shows

These findings are drawn from Flock contract documents, the January 2026 Council working session, public records requests, and direct resident engagement. Every major claim below is sourced from the Town's own records or public statements.

Contract facts: 10 cameras, $71,750, vendor-owned

The Apex order form lists 5 Flock Safety Falcon cameras and 5 Flock Safety Falcon Flex cameras, with FlockOS included and Advanced Search added. The initial term is 24 months with a 24-month renewal. Year one cost is $36,750; annual recurring cost is $35,000. Total contract value before tax: $71,750.

Retention is set at 30 days. Flock hardware remains Flock's exclusive property. Apex is not permitted to remove, reposition, or take possession of the cameras unless the agreement allows it. This is a subscription to vendor-controlled infrastructure, not a town-owned system.

The contract also grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute anonymized data derived from Apex's cameras to improve services, train machine-learning algorithms, and support development. "Anonymized" does not always mean risk-free in mobility datasets.

This is not "just a camera" — Flock's own materials say so

Flock describes its platform as a "public safety operating system" connecting neighborhoods, schools, businesses, and law enforcement. The platform includes LPR, live video capability, audio detection, AVL/CAD integrations, and other situational tools.

Flock's "Simplified Search" allows users to search activity tied to a single vehicle across publicly and privately owned cameras using filters including make, body type, color, plates, partial tags, missing tags, temporary tags, decals, bumper stickers, back racks, and roof racks. This is structured, searchable movement intelligence.

Users can access "1B+ additional plate reads each month" through sharing networks, including one-to-one, national, and statewide search networks, with connections to NCIC, Amber Alerts, FBI, and other external databases.

What the Chief said at the January working session

The Chief described Flock as a searchable database with plate records, real-time alerting, vehicle-based investigative value, AI-assisted identification features, and retention-based search utility. The town's own public defense establishes this is not passive observation.

The Chief cited several investigative "wins," including an ATM jackpotting case, a stolen-vehicle/burglary-ring case, and a motor-vehicle break-in series. However, the jackpotting claim remains unverified in produced records: no incident number, no produced case file tying Apex Flock to the case, and no independent public corroboration.

The Chief said Apex has 10 cameras across 26 square miles, placed to maximize plate reads at major ingress/egress and high-traffic points, with no cameras inside residential neighborhoods. The siting logic is broad traffic capture, not targeted surveillance of specific known criminal locations.

The system had been live approximately 90 days at the time of the working session. Apex was making strong operational claims very early in the system's lifecycle.

The Chief admitted sharing controls lack "teeth"

Outside agencies must request permission, approval is controlled by the captain over the Flock program, and Apex requires agencies to agree to data-sharing terms. But the Chief also said: the compliance framework may lack meaningful consequences if an agency doesn't comply.

The control mechanism appears partly trust-based. This is a major governance weakness in a system designed for cross-jurisdictional sharing.

The private camera question: Lowe's and sensitive sites

In the working session, the Chief described private Flock cameras as separate from the town system. But a July 2024 letter to Lowe's requested regional access to Lowe's-owned Flock and/or LiveView for investigative use, which appears broader than simple stolen-vehicle alerts.

No Lowe's response, final agreement, access terms, retention terms, or limit document has been produced. It remains unknown whether access was granted, whether it was alert-only or broader search access, and whether other private entities have similar arrangements.

A separate concern involves private Flock cameras at sensitive sites such as hospitals. The issue is not simply whether a private site has a camera. It is whether police have alerts or search access, and whether those sites are part of a police-accessible surveillance network that could track visits to medical facilities, schools, or religious institutions.

The procurement history goes back to 2023

Records show a 2023 Flock agreement was approved, signed, and followed by procurement activity, but that earlier deal appears to have stalled or not been implemented. The current deployment came through a revived or replacement path.

The push appears to have originated through Apex Police, not through a council-led civic technology policy process. The origin point is law-enforcement operational preference, not a neutral public policy process.

Flock retains disclosure rights and PR support

The contract says Flock may access, use, preserve, and disclose footage to law enforcement, government officials, or third parties if legally required or if Flock has a good-faith belief disclosure is necessary. Apex does not have absolute practical control over every scenario involving its footage.

Flock's proposal also says it supports agencies in educating stakeholders, including city councils, and can help share crimes solved in local media through its PR team. Public narratives around "wins" may be vendor-supported. Success stories should be independently verified.

Five key contradictions in the record

1. "It is limited" vs. the platform is built to network. Apex emphasizes 30-day retention, no facial recognition, and local controls. Flock's own materials describe a platform designed for public/private camera search, national sharing, live video, audio detection, and broad integrations.

2. "We can verify safeguards" vs. records are missing. The working session relied on assurances: auditing, controls, approvals, limited sharing. The town has not produced the records necessary to independently verify use, outcomes, audits, or enforcement of safeguards.

3. "Private cameras are separate" vs. the Lowe's letter. The Chief described private systems as separate, but the Lowe's letter requested broader regional investigative access to private Flock/LiveView infrastructure.

4. "Crime-solving wins" vs. unverified claims. The Chief cited vivid examples, but the produced records do not yet let the public validate those claims independently.

5. "We control sharing" vs. "not a lot of teeth." The Chief said Apex controls outside access but acknowledged the compliance framework may lack meaningful consequences.

What the Town has not produced

These records have been requested or are necessary for meaningful public accountability. None have been fully produced.

Deployment and scope

  • × Full deployment map or location list
  • × Town-owned vs. privately owned but APD-accessible distinction
  • × Placement approvals for public land or right-of-way

Usage and oversight

  • × Monthly usage statistics (total reads, searches, alerts)
  • × Alerts leading to enforcement action
  • × Audit and compliance records
  • × Cross-agency data-sharing records
  • × Misuse investigations

Effectiveness

  • × Crime trend analysis tied to Flock deployment
  • × Flock-attributable arrests and recoveries
  • × Cost-benefit or ROI analysis
  • × Justification for number and placement of cameras

Policy and rules

  • × Governing written policy with enforceable limits
  • × Rules for accessing systems not operated by APD
  • × Accountability mechanisms with real consequences
  • × Private-camera access agreements (Lowe's, hospitals, others)

Source: Apex/Flock project memo, public records requests, and Flock contract/proposal documents.

Have you been tracked?

Check if your license plate has been searched in Flock's system and see concerning trends in how the technology is being used nationwide.

Check at HaveIBeenFlocked.com →

What are automated license plate readers?

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs or LPRs) are AI-powered cameras that capture and analyze images of all passing vehicles, storing details like your car's location, date, and time. They also capture your car's make, model, color, and identifying features such as dents, roof racks, and bumper stickers, often turning these into searchable data points.

These cameras collect data on millions of vehicles regardless of whether the driver is suspected of a crime. These systems are marketed as indispensable tools to fight crime, but they ignore the powerful tools police already have to track criminals, such as cell phone location data, creating a loophole that doesn't require a warrant.

For a detailed explanation, see the ACLU's overview of location tracking and the EFF's guide to ALPRs.

Explanation adapted from DeFlock.org, by Christophe.

This is not just about cameras.

A normal camera records a place. Flock creates searchable vehicle-location records, sends alerts, supports investigative searches, and can connect public and private camera networks. The issue is automated collection, aggregation, search, sharing, and normalization of movement tracking at scale.

Searchable movement records

Every vehicle passing a Flock camera is logged with plate number, vehicle description, location, direction, and timestamp. This data is searchable by police without a warrant.

Public/private network risk

Flock operates a national sharing network. A public records request in Boulder, CO revealed over 6,000 agencies had access, despite the transparency portal listing about 90. Flock also sells cameras to HOAs and businesses.

Weak public accountability

Flock claims 10% of U.S. crime is solved using their technology, but that study was conducted by Flock employees. Independent research found no significant deterrent effect from ALPRs in crime hot spots.

Why you should be concerned

ALPRs invade your privacy and threaten your civil liberties. The evidence:

ALPRs do not reduce crime

There is no independent research proving ALPRs reduce crime. Flock's own claim that 10% of U.S. crime is solved using their technology was conducted by two Flock employees. One of the academic researchers listed as an overseer has since expressed concerns about the study, as reported by 404 Media. Independent research in the Journal of Experimental Criminology found no significant deterrent effect. A separate study found less than 0.3% of ALPR hits in Piedmont, CA translated into a useful investigative lead.

ALPRs are a major security risk

Companies making ALPRs have a documented history of poor security:

  • In November 2025, a security researcher found Flock logins for sale on Russian hacking forums. Flock does not require multi-factor authentication.
  • In January 2025, Motorola Solutions' ALPR system was found to have a critical flaw allowing anyone to access live data, including plate numbers, vehicle details, and camera feeds.
  • In July 2025, Flock exposed a misconfigured demo site revealing internal search tools and a live ArcGIS API key with access to over 50 private data layers.
ALPRs are dragnet surveillance

A study of ALPRs in Piedmont, CA found less than 0.3% of hits might translate into a useful investigative lead. Over 99.7% of plates recorded belonged to people not on any hot list. Flock's own transparency portals confirm this: the vast majority of scans are of people not suspected of anything.

ALPRs are routinely abused
  • Texas police tracked a woman who had an abortion across state lines using Flock.
  • A Kansas officer used Flock to stalk his estranged wife.
  • An Ohio officer used ALPRs to stalk his ex-girlfriend.
  • California agencies kept data longer than policy allowed and shared it with unauthorized agencies.
ALPR usage leads to dangerous police encounters
  • A San Francisco woman was pulled from her car at gunpoint because of a plate reader error.
  • Police in Colorado terrorized a Black family, including children, over a misidentified vehicle.
  • A Denver woman had to prove her innocence after detectives used Flock cameras to accuse her of a $25 package theft.
ALPRs result in racist policing

The EFF reviewed Oakland PD's ALPR data and found cameras disproportionately scanned communities with higher densities of Black and brown residents. In Oak Park, IL, 84% of drivers stopped because of Flock cameras in the first 10 months were Black. After 9/11, the NYPD used ALPRs to monitor Muslims visiting mosques.

ALPRs put undocumented people at risk

Police agencies routinely share ALPR data with ICE, even in jurisdictions where it is prohibited. 404 Media reported that ICE taps into Flock's nationwide camera network. Pasadena and Long Beach police shared data with ICE despite pledging not to.

Camera locations near Apex

Interactive map of known ALPR camera locations in and around Apex. Data by DeFlock.

Can't see the map? Open DeFlock Maps directly. Know of a camera? Report it.

Our asks to Apex Town Council

1

Cancel or decline renewal

End the current Flock contract. Do not renew.

2

Reject any expansion

No additional cameras, no Flock OS, no live video, no real-time crime center tools, no private-camera network access.

3

Publish the records

Release deployment maps, usage statistics, audit reports, sharing agreements, and effectiveness data.

4

Adopt a surveillance ordinance

Require public notice, privacy impact review, competitive procurement, and Council approval before any future surveillance technology.

Pressure Council before renewal or expansion.

Pick one action and do it this week.

Email Town Council

Send a direct message to all six members asking them to state their position and commit to a public vote.

Open pre-drafted email →

Attend the next Council meeting

Regular meetings: 2nd and 4th Tuesday, 6:00 PM. Apex Town Hall, 73 Hunter Street, 2nd Floor.

View Town calendar →

Speak for three minutes

Sign in with Town Clerk Allen Coleman before the meeting. State your name and address. Groups of 4+ get up to 9 minutes.

Contact Town Clerk →

Submit written public comment

Email public.forum@apexnc.org by 3:00 PM on the meeting date. Include your name and address.

Submit written comment →

Share with neighbors

Send this site to neighbors, HOA groups, and community threads: deflockapex.org

Copy site link →
Sample question for Council
Will you vote to remove Flock from Apex and oppose any future expansion of networked surveillance without public approval?

Get involved

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Evidence, records, and timeline

Sourced from official records and direct civic engagement.

📅

Apex Flock timeline

Adoption, deployment, council discussion, contract milestones.

📄

Contracts and order forms

Terms, pricing, renewal dates, addenda from public records.

🔍

Public records requests

Filed requests, responses, and outstanding items.

📨

Town responses

Official replies to resident inquiries about deployment and policy.

🎥

Meeting agendas and videos

Agendas, minutes, and recordings where Flock was discussed.

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Budget references

Line items, approvals, and cost information.

Frequently asked questions

Is this anti-police?

No. This is about public accountability for a specific surveillance technology, not policing itself. Police had investigative tools before Flock and will have them after. The question is whether mass, warrantless tracking of every vehicle is necessary, proportionate, and subject to adequate oversight.

Are license plates public?

Seeing a plate on the road is different from logging it in a searchable database. The distinction is between incidental observation and systematic, aggregated tracking of movement patterns across agencies over time.

Does Flock solve crimes?

Flock's own study was conducted by employees and has drawn concern from an academic overseer. Independent research found no significant deterrent effect and less than 0.3% of hits translated into useful leads. The question is whether mass collection is justified by the evidence.

Why isn't 30-day retention enough?

Thirty days is enough to reconstruct commute patterns, identify associations, and track visits to sensitive locations. The concern is not just retention length. It is that mass collection occurs without individualized suspicion, a warrant, or meaningful oversight.

Are ALPRs a necessary tool for police?

No. Police have always had methods to obtain location information for suspects: cell phone records, surveillance warrants, informants. Those methods require establishing probable cause. ALPRs skip that step by collecting on everyone, all the time, and searching without oversight.

Do these cameras only record vehicles involved in crimes?

No. ALPRs record every vehicle that passes, regardless of whether the driver is suspected of anything. Your plate, vehicle description, location, and timestamp are captured and stored whether you are on a hot list or not.

Do police need a warrant to search this data?

No. The data is treated as owned by the police department. Officers can search it without a warrant. Many agencies have opted into Flock's national sharing network, meaning thousands of other agencies can search the data too.

What oversight is there for these systems?

Very little. Some departments have policies, but they are often weak and poorly enforced. Flock offers transparency portals, but they allow agencies to cherry-pick what's shown. Boulder's portal listed about 90 agencies with access; a records request revealed over 6,000.

Can Flock be trusted to keep data safe?

Flock's CEO told Denver 9News the company had no federal contracts. Weeks later, 9News found Border Patrol had access. A Boulder records request confirmed Border Patrol was searching over 6,000 agencies. Flock has been caught misrepresenting their practices multiple times.

What should Apex do instead?

Targeted investigations with warrants. Improved infrastructure. Community policing. Any future surveillance technology should require public notice, privacy impact review, competitive procurement, independent audits, and a Council vote.

How can I get these cameras out of my city or town?

Show up at council meetings, email officials, file public records requests, build a coalition of neighbors, and put the question on the public record. In April and May 2026, both Chatham County and Pittsboro voted to end their Flock contracts after sustained resident advocacy.

Similar projects

Other initiatives working to protect privacy and track surveillance infrastructure.

Key links

Organizations and resources leading the national effort against warrantless vehicle surveillance.