The Town of Apex has deployed Flock automated license plate readers that record and store the movements of every vehicle on surveilled roads. The data is searchable by law enforcement without a warrant. No public vote authorized the deployment. No independent audit has evaluated its effectiveness. DeFlock Apex is a resident-led campaign to remove Flock, stop expansion, and require public approval before any surveillance technology is deployed in Apex.
Independent resident-led advocacy project. Built from public records, council materials, and direct civic engagement.
Last updated: May 13, 2026
Flock stays or goes because six elected officials decide. This tracker shows our current read on each member's position. The Council appears divided. Resident pressure can still shape the outcome.
If a Council member believes their position is misstated, they can clarify it in writing and we will update the tracker. Positions are based on public comments, council discussion, written responses, votes, and direct resident engagement.
These findings are drawn from Flock contract documents, the January 2026 Council working session, public records requests, and direct resident engagement. Every major claim below is sourced from the Town's own records or public statements.
The Apex order form lists 5 Flock Safety Falcon cameras and 5 Flock Safety Falcon Flex cameras, with FlockOS included and Advanced Search added. The initial term is 24 months with a 24-month renewal. Year one cost is $36,750; annual recurring cost is $35,000. Total contract value before tax: $71,750.
Retention is set at 30 days. Flock hardware remains Flock's exclusive property. Apex is not permitted to remove, reposition, or take possession of the cameras unless the agreement allows it. This is a subscription to vendor-controlled infrastructure, not a town-owned system.
The contract also grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right to use and distribute anonymized data derived from Apex's cameras to improve services, train machine-learning algorithms, and support development. "Anonymized" does not always mean risk-free in mobility datasets.
Flock describes its platform as a "public safety operating system" connecting neighborhoods, schools, businesses, and law enforcement. The platform includes LPR, live video capability, audio detection, AVL/CAD integrations, and other situational tools.
Flock's "Simplified Search" allows users to search activity tied to a single vehicle across publicly and privately owned cameras using filters including make, body type, color, plates, partial tags, missing tags, temporary tags, decals, bumper stickers, back racks, and roof racks. This is structured, searchable movement intelligence.
Users can access "1B+ additional plate reads each month" through sharing networks, including one-to-one, national, and statewide search networks, with connections to NCIC, Amber Alerts, FBI, and other external databases.
The Chief described Flock as a searchable database with plate records, real-time alerting, vehicle-based investigative value, AI-assisted identification features, and retention-based search utility. The town's own public defense establishes this is not passive observation.
The Chief cited several investigative "wins," including an ATM jackpotting case, a stolen-vehicle/burglary-ring case, and a motor-vehicle break-in series. However, the jackpotting claim remains unverified in produced records: no incident number, no produced case file tying Apex Flock to the case, and no independent public corroboration.
The Chief said Apex has 10 cameras across 26 square miles, placed to maximize plate reads at major ingress/egress and high-traffic points, with no cameras inside residential neighborhoods. The siting logic is broad traffic capture, not targeted surveillance of specific known criminal locations.
The system had been live approximately 90 days at the time of the working session. Apex was making strong operational claims very early in the system's lifecycle.
Outside agencies must request permission, approval is controlled by the captain over the Flock program, and Apex requires agencies to agree to data-sharing terms. But the Chief also said: the compliance framework may lack meaningful consequences if an agency doesn't comply.
The control mechanism appears partly trust-based. This is a major governance weakness in a system designed for cross-jurisdictional sharing.
In the working session, the Chief described private Flock cameras as separate from the town system. But a July 2024 letter to Lowe's requested regional access to Lowe's-owned Flock and/or LiveView for investigative use, which appears broader than simple stolen-vehicle alerts.
No Lowe's response, final agreement, access terms, retention terms, or limit document has been produced. It remains unknown whether access was granted, whether it was alert-only or broader search access, and whether other private entities have similar arrangements.
A separate concern involves private Flock cameras at sensitive sites such as hospitals. The issue is not simply whether a private site has a camera. It is whether police have alerts or search access, and whether those sites are part of a police-accessible surveillance network that could track visits to medical facilities, schools, or religious institutions.
Records show a 2023 Flock agreement was approved, signed, and followed by procurement activity, but that earlier deal appears to have stalled or not been implemented. The current deployment came through a revived or replacement path.
The push appears to have originated through Apex Police, not through a council-led civic technology policy process. The origin point is law-enforcement operational preference, not a neutral public policy process.
The contract says Flock may access, use, preserve, and disclose footage to law enforcement, government officials, or third parties if legally required or if Flock has a good-faith belief disclosure is necessary. Apex does not have absolute practical control over every scenario involving its footage.
Flock's proposal also says it supports agencies in educating stakeholders, including city councils, and can help share crimes solved in local media through its PR team. Public narratives around "wins" may be vendor-supported. Success stories should be independently verified.
1. "It is limited" vs. the platform is built to network. Apex emphasizes 30-day retention, no facial recognition, and local controls. Flock's own materials describe a platform designed for public/private camera search, national sharing, live video, audio detection, and broad integrations.
2. "We can verify safeguards" vs. records are missing. The working session relied on assurances: auditing, controls, approvals, limited sharing. The town has not produced the records necessary to independently verify use, outcomes, audits, or enforcement of safeguards.
3. "Private cameras are separate" vs. the Lowe's letter. The Chief described private systems as separate, but the Lowe's letter requested broader regional investigative access to private Flock/LiveView infrastructure.
4. "Crime-solving wins" vs. unverified claims. The Chief cited vivid examples, but the produced records do not yet let the public validate those claims independently.
5. "We control sharing" vs. "not a lot of teeth." The Chief said Apex controls outside access but acknowledged the compliance framework may lack meaningful consequences.
These records have been requested or are necessary for meaningful public accountability. None have been fully produced.
Source: Apex/Flock project memo, public records requests, and Flock contract/proposal documents.
Check if your license plate has been searched in Flock's system and see concerning trends in how the technology is being used nationwide.
Check at HaveIBeenFlocked.com →Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs or LPRs) are AI-powered cameras that capture and analyze images of all passing vehicles, storing details like your car's location, date, and time. They also capture your car's make, model, color, and identifying features such as dents, roof racks, and bumper stickers, often turning these into searchable data points.
These cameras collect data on millions of vehicles regardless of whether the driver is suspected of a crime. These systems are marketed as indispensable tools to fight crime, but they ignore the powerful tools police already have to track criminals, such as cell phone location data, creating a loophole that doesn't require a warrant.
For a detailed explanation, see the ACLU's overview of location tracking and the EFF's guide to ALPRs.
Explanation adapted from DeFlock.org, by Christophe.
A normal camera records a place. Flock creates searchable vehicle-location records, sends alerts, supports investigative searches, and can connect public and private camera networks. The issue is automated collection, aggregation, search, sharing, and normalization of movement tracking at scale.
Every vehicle passing a Flock camera is logged with plate number, vehicle description, location, direction, and timestamp. This data is searchable by police without a warrant.
Flock operates a national sharing network. A public records request in Boulder, CO revealed over 6,000 agencies had access, despite the transparency portal listing about 90. Flock also sells cameras to HOAs and businesses.
Flock claims 10% of U.S. crime is solved using their technology, but that study was conducted by Flock employees. Independent research found no significant deterrent effect from ALPRs in crime hot spots.
ALPRs invade your privacy and threaten your civil liberties. The evidence:
There is no independent research proving ALPRs reduce crime. Flock's own claim that 10% of U.S. crime is solved using their technology was conducted by two Flock employees. One of the academic researchers listed as an overseer has since expressed concerns about the study, as reported by 404 Media. Independent research in the Journal of Experimental Criminology found no significant deterrent effect. A separate study found less than 0.3% of ALPR hits in Piedmont, CA translated into a useful investigative lead.
Companies making ALPRs have a documented history of poor security:
A study of ALPRs in Piedmont, CA found less than 0.3% of hits might translate into a useful investigative lead. Over 99.7% of plates recorded belonged to people not on any hot list. Flock's own transparency portals confirm this: the vast majority of scans are of people not suspected of anything.
The EFF reviewed Oakland PD's ALPR data and found cameras disproportionately scanned communities with higher densities of Black and brown residents. In Oak Park, IL, 84% of drivers stopped because of Flock cameras in the first 10 months were Black. After 9/11, the NYPD used ALPRs to monitor Muslims visiting mosques.
Police agencies routinely share ALPR data with ICE, even in jurisdictions where it is prohibited. 404 Media reported that ICE taps into Flock's nationwide camera network. Pasadena and Long Beach police shared data with ICE despite pledging not to.
Interactive map of known ALPR camera locations in and around Apex. Data by DeFlock.
Can't see the map? Open DeFlock Maps directly. Know of a camera? Report it.
End the current Flock contract. Do not renew.
No additional cameras, no Flock OS, no live video, no real-time crime center tools, no private-camera network access.
Release deployment maps, usage statistics, audit reports, sharing agreements, and effectiveness data.
Require public notice, privacy impact review, competitive procurement, and Council approval before any future surveillance technology.
Pick one action and do it this week.
Send a direct message to all six members asking them to state their position and commit to a public vote.
Open pre-drafted email →Regular meetings: 2nd and 4th Tuesday, 6:00 PM. Apex Town Hall, 73 Hunter Street, 2nd Floor.
View Town calendar →Sign in with Town Clerk Allen Coleman before the meeting. State your name and address. Groups of 4+ get up to 9 minutes.
Contact Town Clerk →Email public.forum@apexnc.org by 3:00 PM on the meeting date. Include your name and address.
Submit written comment →Send this site to neighbors, HOA groups, and community threads: deflockapex.org
Copy site link →Will you vote to remove Flock from Apex and oppose any future expansion of networked surveillance without public approval?
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Sourced from official records and direct civic engagement.
Adoption, deployment, council discussion, contract milestones.
Terms, pricing, renewal dates, addenda from public records.
Filed requests, responses, and outstanding items.
Official replies to resident inquiries about deployment and policy.
Agendas, minutes, and recordings where Flock was discussed.
Line items, approvals, and cost information.
No. This is about public accountability for a specific surveillance technology, not policing itself. Police had investigative tools before Flock and will have them after. The question is whether mass, warrantless tracking of every vehicle is necessary, proportionate, and subject to adequate oversight.
Seeing a plate on the road is different from logging it in a searchable database. The distinction is between incidental observation and systematic, aggregated tracking of movement patterns across agencies over time.
Flock's own study was conducted by employees and has drawn concern from an academic overseer. Independent research found no significant deterrent effect and less than 0.3% of hits translated into useful leads. The question is whether mass collection is justified by the evidence.
Thirty days is enough to reconstruct commute patterns, identify associations, and track visits to sensitive locations. The concern is not just retention length. It is that mass collection occurs without individualized suspicion, a warrant, or meaningful oversight.
No. Police have always had methods to obtain location information for suspects: cell phone records, surveillance warrants, informants. Those methods require establishing probable cause. ALPRs skip that step by collecting on everyone, all the time, and searching without oversight.
No. ALPRs record every vehicle that passes, regardless of whether the driver is suspected of anything. Your plate, vehicle description, location, and timestamp are captured and stored whether you are on a hot list or not.
No. The data is treated as owned by the police department. Officers can search it without a warrant. Many agencies have opted into Flock's national sharing network, meaning thousands of other agencies can search the data too.
Very little. Some departments have policies, but they are often weak and poorly enforced. Flock offers transparency portals, but they allow agencies to cherry-pick what's shown. Boulder's portal listed about 90 agencies with access; a records request revealed over 6,000.
Flock's CEO told Denver 9News the company had no federal contracts. Weeks later, 9News found Border Patrol had access. A Boulder records request confirmed Border Patrol was searching over 6,000 agencies. Flock has been caught misrepresenting their practices multiple times.
Targeted investigations with warrants. Improved infrastructure. Community policing. Any future surveillance technology should require public notice, privacy impact review, competitive procurement, independent audits, and a Council vote.
Show up at council meetings, email officials, file public records requests, build a coalition of neighbors, and put the question on the public record. In April and May 2026, both Chatham County and Pittsboro voted to end their Flock contracts after sustained resident advocacy.
Other initiatives working to protect privacy and track surveillance infrastructure.
Get directions that avoid ALPR cameras, and see how many are normally on your route.
Find upcoming public meetings related to ALPR deployments.
Dashboard for tracking Flock usage patterns, including total cameras and top search reasons.
Map of locations where ALPRs may be, based on 811 locate requests, FOIA, and other sources.
Explore recently added Flock cameras in the US.
EFF's comprehensive database of surveillance technologies used by law enforcement.
The Institute for Justice's site analyzing ALPR usage patterns in the US.
The campaign that ended Flock in Pittsboro, NC. A model for local advocacy.
Organizations and resources leading the national effort against warrantless vehicle surveillance.